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206 P H E N O M E N O L O G Y
PHENOMENOLOGY
Tamsin Lorraine
Phenomenology as a philosophical movement was founded by Edmund 
Husserl. René Descartes, Immanuel Kant and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 
Hegel are important precursors to this movement that insists upon 
returning to ‘the things themselves’, or phenomena as they appear to us, 
in order to ground knowledge in the apodictic certainty of self- evident 
truth. Husserl instituted a method of ‘bracketing’ that suspends meta-
physical questions about what is ‘out there’, and instead focuses on phe-
nomenological descriptions of experience itself. Husserl took from Franz 
Brentano the notion that consciousness is intentional – that is, that it is 
always conscious of something. To investigate what lies outside of con-
sciousness is fruitless. Instead, we should investigate the structure and 
contents of our conscious experiences. By suspending the ‘natural atti-
tude’ (that is, the assumption that our experience is caused by something 
‘out there’) with its reifying prejudices, we can discover and describe the 
‘eidetic essences’ that structure consciousness. This, in turn, will reveal 
how our knowledge is constituted and will give us a new method for 
grounding knowledge in our ‘pre- predicative experience’ (that is, expe-
rience that has not yet been posited from the perspective of the natural 
attitude).
Martin Heidegger, Emmanuel Lévinas, Jean- Paul Sartre, and Maurice 
Merleau Ponty were some of those inspired by Husserl to develop various 
responses to versions of phenomenology. But whereas Husserl thought of 
phenomenology as a rigorous science of consciousness, these philosophers 
emphasise the notion (created by Heidegger) of ‘being- in- the- world’ and 
direct their attention toward the lived experience of an embodied subject 
always already immersed in a world from which she cannot separate 
herself. Phenomenology’s insistence on describing phenomena as they 
appear thus opened up to philosophical refl ection the realm of experi-
ence as it is experienced by ordinary individuals in everyday life prior to 
the theoretical attitude of ‘objective’ thought. It was embraced by many 
as a revitalising alternative to forms of philosophical thought such as 
positivism (another important philosophical movement prominent in the 
early twentieth century) that took the methods of natural science as their 
paradigm.
On Deleuze’s view, phenomenology’s emphasis on lived experience 
territorialises philosophy onto habitual forms of perception and concep-
tion (perception formed from the point of view of the self or thought 
in keeping with the form of the ‘I’). Deleuze sought to determine an 
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‘impersonal and pre- individual transcendental fi eld’ that is the condi-
tion of any actual conscious experience (D 1990: 102). In Foucault, 
Deleuze lauds Michel Foucault for converting phenomenology into 
epistemology. There is a gap between what we perceive and what we say 
‘as though intentionality denied itself ’ (D 1988b: 109). There is no such 
thing as a pure or ‘savage’ experience prior to or underlying knowledge. 
The gap between what we say and what we feel and perceive (as well as 
the Bergsonian gap Deleuze characterises in his Cinema books that can 
open up between perception and action) indicates implicit tendencies or 
forces that insist in what we say and do. The conscious experiences of an 
individual are the emergent effects of virtual, as well as actually unfold-
ing, forces of which the individual is, for the most part, unaware. The 
singularities or events defi ning these forces constitute a transcendental 
fi eld of the virtual that may never be actualised in individual bodies. 
Events of sense (for example, the concepts of philosophy), as well as 
events of physical processes (for example, the capacity to fall, to run, 
to sweat) and their virtual relations ‘insist’ in concrete states of affairs, 
whether or not they actually unfold in specifi c speech- acts or physical 
states.
Philosophy as ‘genuine thinking’ does not attempt to represent or 
describe, but rather to make things happen by creating concepts in 
response to the problems of life that actualise the virtual relations of the 
transcendental fi eld in novel ways. Phenomenology’s invocation of the 
‘primordial lived’ renders immanence in terms of what is immanent to a 
subject’s experience rather than processes unfolding at levels below as well 
as above the threshold of consciousness, thus grounding its investigations 
in what are, in Deleuze and Guattari’s view, opinions that are already 
clichés extracted from experience (D&G 1994: 150). The notion of a 
world ‘teaming’ with anonymous, nomadic, impersonal and pre individual 
singularities opens up the fi eld of the transcendental and allows thinking 
of individuals in terms of the singularities that are their condition, rather 
than in terms of the synthetic and analytic unities of conscious experience 
(D 1990: 103).
Connectives
Bergson
Experience
Foucault
Singularity
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